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Abstract
This article discusses the Fast Food Shutdown, a strike on 4 October 2018 that 
involved Wetherspoon, McDonald’s, TGI Fridays and UberEats workers in the 
United Kingdom. It compares the different strategies of the Bakers Food and 
Allied Workers’ Union at Wetherspoon and Industrial Workers of the World at 
UberEats. The two case studies, drawing on the authors’ ongoing ethnographic 
research, provide important examples of successful precarious worker organising. 
In particular, the argument focuses on the role of action in organising, as well as 
the relationship between the rank-and-file and the union. While these could point 
the way to the recomposition of the workers movement – both in greenfield sectors 
and within existing unions – there remain important questions about how these 
experiences can be generalised.
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Introduction
On 4 October 2018, workers at four companies (Wetherspoon, McDonald’s, TGI 
Fridays and UberEats) took coordinated strike action as part of a ‘Fast Food Shutdown’. 
This article compares the organising approaches adopted by the Bakers Food and Allied 
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Workers’ Union (BFAWU) and Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) at Wetherspoon 
and UberEats, respectively, in the run up to this strike. Through this comparison, we will 
develop an account of how some unions are moving from disorganisation to action in 
‘greenfield’, precarious, low-density service sector workplaces in Britain. In particular, we 
will identify the importance of organising for action instead of for representation, the 
necessity of unions acting responsively to worker self-organisation and the centrality of 
rank-and-file control over processes of collective action.
Data on these two case studies were collected through ethnographic engagement fol-
lowing the tradition of ‘workers’ inquiry’ (see Woodcock 2014). Hence, both authors 
were involved in various ways with the disputes in Brighton and London. This entailed 
attending meetings in the run up to the strikes, visiting picket lines, as well as 10 semi-
structured interviews with Wetherspoon workers and informal discussions with IWW 
organisers. This involved the kind of engaged research that Burawoy (1989: 14) has 
discussed, with ‘interventions’ not understood as something just to be minimised. The 
critical engagement both authors undertook provides evidence that is reflected upon in 
this article. The two chosen case studies are still developing yet, in our experience, pro-
vide an important starting point for thinking through the changes in organising in 
Britain today.
Both of these case studies are examples of ‘distant expansion’, or the recruitment of 
workers in workplaces without pre-existing union branches or recognition agreements 
(Kelly & Heery 1989). The failure to achieve this kind of expansion, particularly in 
greenfield private service sector workplaces, has been shown to be the predominant fac-
tor in the decline of union membership in Britain since 1979 (Disney et al. 1995, 
Machin 2000). As a result, the question of how to reverse the failures of distant expan-
sion is central to discussions of how the workers’ movement can be revitalised in the 
contemporary context (Gall 2005a, 2005b).
Our empirical discussion of distant expansion and greenfield organising in the con-
temporary context draws upon Bronfenbrenner and Juravich’s work conducted over the 
1990s in the United States. In a series of studies covering both public and private sectors 
(Bronfenbrenner 1997; Bronfenbrenner & Juravich 1995, 1998; Juravich & 
Bronfenbrenner 2005), they that argued using an aggressive rank-and-file oriented strat-
egy increased the chances of organising success. The two case studies examined here 
provide striking evidence of the continuing relevance of this in the context of increas-
ingly recomposed technical and social class composition (Notes from Below 2018b).
Wetherspoon and BFAWU
The organising drive at Wetherspoon was not initiated by the BFAWU. Instead, it came 
from the shop floor. In late 2017, workers at a large (>50 employees) Wetherspoon in 
Brighton were facing unreliable shift scheduling and authoritarian management practice. 
Workers on the lower rungs of the internal Wetherspoon labour market perceived that 
their supervisors were putting together the shift rota without sufficient care for their spe-
cific circumstances. In response, a small group decided to turn their existing and informal 
workplace network into a scaffolding for collective action. At the same time doing this 
and having initial discussions with other workers, this small group contacted the BFAWU 
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– who had recently been involved in highly publicised strike activity at McDonald’s. 
Initially, it provided these workers with minimal support, telling them to recruit their co-
workers and take no other form of action until achieving a 50% density. Upon the reach-
ing of this target, the BFAWU strategy was to seek a recognition agreement through either 
statutory or voluntary means. However, rapid labour turnover and lack of ‘buy-in’ among 
the wider workforce meant that this density target evaded the nascent union branch. 
Despite the efforts of a small number of organisers, density hovered around 30% for 
months. However, this initial organising work succeeded in spreading the organising drive 
to another Brighton Wetherspoon (again with >50 employees).
In mid-2018, the union strategy changed for the organising drive was now be con-
ducted according to the one which had proved successful at McDonald’s. Hence, 
BFAWU’s ‘Fast Food’ campaign would be the internal point of contact for the two 
Brighton branches. Workers would map their workplaces, systematically build support 
for collective action through one-to-one organising conversations and then take limited 
forms of workplace collective action over specific small grievances, before building 
towards strike action over wages and union recognition. The process would be supported 
by a team of experienced organisers devoting time and energy to mapping, developing 
and stress testing the workplace organisation in the two pubs.
Drawing from the ‘Fight for $15’ campaign in the United States, this strategy proved 
more successful. Thus, density rose in both pubs. In the first pub, a collective ‘march on 
the boss’ in work time to present a signed letter from the majority of staff on shift sched-
uling proved successful. This first collective action functioned not only as part of the 
union escalation strategy but also to stress test shop floor organisation (see McAlevey 
2016). The strategy continued to be pursued. A dispute was declared and a strike ballot 
won. A day of strike action was announced for 4 October 2018. The process of building 
for the strike saw a sense of confident excitement develop among workers and aided 
further recruitment.
The strike began at midnight with workers and supporters cheering strikers as they 
walked out. No morning pickets were mounted to obstruct the entry of strike-breakers. 
Instead, workers boarded a union-funded coach to London, where they participated in a 
multi-union demonstration in Leicester Square addressed by the Labour Shadow 
Chancellor, John McDonnell. The strikers went on to have a discussion with workers 
from other striking workplaces at TGI Fridays and McDonald’s before heading back to 
Brighton for an evening demonstration and picket. The demonstration was large, and 
mobilised a community coalition of 300 supporters, leading to both pubs closing early. 
Significantly, this was the first action of the day that was conducted without the over-
sight of BFAWU’s media team.
For many, this first experience of striking was transformative. The collective agency 
manifested on the day changed the way they understood themselves, their workplace and 
their union. However, the strike also had contradictory elements. Some workers expressed 
a feeling they did not have full control of the form of their action, leading to dissatisfac-
tion. Centralised union control of details ranging from slogans and media strategy to 
graphic design of strike materials (including T-shirts, banners and stickers) and where 
workers stood on pavements to create the best photo opportunities was a marked con-
trast to earlier phases of the organising drive, which were characterised by a high level of 
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autonomous initiative. Yet, this strategy produced substantial media coverage. In the 
course, Wetherspoon granted significant concessions, despite the limited initial scope of 
the strike action. These included a 60p per hour pay rise, the abolition of the 18–20 pay 
band; a £1 per hour night shift bonus (implemented nationally, although locally the 
union got night shifts scrapped altogether); an annual pay rise being brought forward; 
rota issues being resolved and pub management being reshuffled following formal griev-
ance procedures.
IWW
The IWW has a distinct organisational history and structure, requiring some contex-
tual introduction. It was founded in Chicago 1905, with a constitution containing the 
preamble: ‘The working class and the employing class have nothing in common’. It 
grew to become a revolutionary syndicalist union of not just national but global con-
sequence (Cole et al. 2017). The union did not build a substantial base in Britain 
during the 20th century but has taken steps towards doing so in the 21st century. The 
IWW carried out its first lawfully sanctioned strike in Britain in 2012 (Kirkpatrick 
2014) and in 2015 its membership reached over 1,000 members, rising to nearly 2,000 
by 2018 (Certification Officer 2016, 2019). Most IWW members join because they 
are highly motivated supporters of revolutionary syndicalism inspired by its history, 
rather than because the union is an organised force in their workplace. Yet this recent 
growth suggests this is changing.
The IWW and BFAWU are substantially unlike in two key ways. First, the IWW has 
nothing like the centralised infrastructure of the BFAWU. This is not just a question of 
scale: the IWW employs no staff on political principle, and as a result it relies on volun-
teers to organise and administer its branches. This structure has both advantages and 
disadvantages, but one of its most prominent effects is that the union can be exception-
ally flexible and reactive. Second, it has no formal relationship to the Trades Union 
Congress or the Labour Party, likewise increasing its potential flexibility of action.
UberEats and Deliveroo are also unlike Wetherspoon in that they are not long-
neglected service sector workplaces, but rather entirely new dispersed workplaces that 
have grown rapidly over the last few years. This rapid growth has been combined with 
a rapid process of research, which has come to a series of important early realisations: 
food delivery platform workers meet each other at accumulation points in the labour 
process, build digitally mediated networks on WhatsApp and used this organisational 
skeleton to take part in repeated collective action directed against these platforms 
(Cant 2018; Waters & Woodcock 2017). The combination of algorithmic manage-
ment technologies (which eliminate the mediating role of workplace supervisors) and 
bogus self-employment (which allows workers to bypass all forms of legislation on 
industrial action but also bars them from gaining statutory recognition) further con-
tributes to a tendency towards worker resistance. This tendency has been expressed 
through a series of successful organising efforts, both in Britain and further afield (see 
Notes from Below 2018a).
The IWW began organising a campaign, variously called ‘Roovolution’ and 
‘DeliverUnion’ in 2016, following in the wake of two large (linked) strikes in UberEats 
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and Deliveroo in London and the success of the Independent Workers Union of Great 
Britain (IWGB) in organising Deliveroo riders in London – particularly in the Camden 
zone. The IWW made initial progress organising workers in Bristol and Leeds, leading 
to wildcat strike action and protests against victimisation and pay cuts for workers lead-
ing training shifts. After this experience, the campaign identified a new grievance and 
re-orientated itself against the classification of UberEats and Deliveroo workers as self-
employed. This new phase of the campaign was supported by local IWW branches but 
did not yield significant results. In Cardiff, the local branch made contact with a number 
of sympathetic riders but it got no further than that. This failure led key IWW organisers 
to reappraise the union’s approach to platform worker organisation.
Through a process of inquiry and discussion with workers, the Cardiff branch spent 
a period of months talking to workers and identifying a different key grievance that 
might catalyse organisation. This was the amount of time couriers were forced to wait 
to collect orders at McDonald’s branches around the city. With workers paid on a piece 
rate per drop, these waits could reduce hourly wages significantly. The renewed organ-
ising campaign abandoned the focus upon self-employment status and re-orientated 
towards ‘bread and butter’ workplace issues. The campaign was centred upon using 
direct action to resolving this issue. The first step in the campaign involved represent-
ing UberEats workers to the McDonald’s franchise management to demand shorter 
waiting times. This was not directly targeted at Uber but was an important grievance 
of these workers.
The campaign developed with a workplace bulletin and adopted a form of hybrid 
organisation. Therefore, while some workers joined the IWW, many began organising 
within the WhatsApp network, without becoming dues-paying members but taking part 
in collective actions. This meant that the IWW gained no further financial resources but 
did bring it and other workers into contact with a much larger network of workers, 
allowing for preparations and action far beyond the IWW’s existing capacities. Actions 
spread, with local strikes in Cardiff, Glasgow and Plymouth. From the action, the cou-
rier network had either sympathetic contacts or fully established branches in city in 
Scotland (Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Stirling and Inverness), England (London, 
Bristol, Manchester, Cambridge, Leicester, Birmingham, Plymouth, Southampton, 
Manchester, Bradford, Leeds, Sheffield and York), Wales (Cardiff, Newport, Swansea 
and Aberystwyth) and Ireland (Derry, Belfast, Dublin and Cork).
Then, in September 2018, there was further wildcat strike action in London by 
UberEats drivers. The IWW responded to this non-union collective action by advancing 
its own proposal for the first ever national food platform strike (involving both Deliveroo 
and UberEats) demanding £5 a drop with a £1 per mile bonus. It decided to use its flex-
ibility and capacity to bypass union laws to call the strike on 4 October – the same day 
as Unite and the BFAWU’s Fast Food strikes. Key organisers within the IWW aimed to 
exploit and develop the potential industrial connections between McDonald’s workers 
on strike and the UberEats workers who delivered from them, as well as tie their strike 
action to a wider narrative about low pay in the service sector. IWW activists in London 
mapped all the McDonald’s in London and divided them into five groups: North, East, 
South, West and Central (Figure 1). Lay IWW members then visited these McDonald’s 
and attempted to recruit key organic leaders in the area and connect the self-organised 
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strike networks to the union. In the process, they distributed up to 10,000 multilingual 
fliers calling for strike action.
The first strike involved large-scale action in London (specifically Lewisham, 
Greenwich, Erith, Surbiton, Shepherds Bush, Hammersmith, Oldsfield, Putney, Bethnal 
Green and Holborn), Newcastle, Bristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh and Glasgow. In the local 
‘zones’ where these strikes took place, platform service was either totally halted or seri-
ously impaired (Woodcock & Hughes 2018). The impact upon workers’ terms and con-
ditions is harder to measure given the lack of formal negotiation and communication 
between workers and management, but workers in many parts suggested that the ‘boost’ 
multipliers used to calculate piece rates increased in the wake of the strike. This organis-
ing effort also has the distinction of having been the subject of high-quality reflexive 
discussion by its participants, which deserves further attention (Fear 2018; Marotta 
2018; Mils 2018; New Syndicalist 2018a, 2018b, 2019).
Discussion
In both case studies, union organising efforts were their most successful when they fol-
lowed roughly the following four-step development: first, accurately identifying a win-
nable workplace-specific grievance; second, mapping the workforce to identify existing 
embryonic solidarities and informal work group structures; third, moving to collective 
action on that winnable grievance; and fourth, escalating from this initial collective 
action towards larger-scale collective action over larger-scale grievances. These are not 
particularly surprising but the case studies also demonstrate elements of novel ‘green-
field’ organising. The point of organising, in both of these case studies, was action 
Figure 1. The map of London McDonald’s used by the IWW Couriers Network.
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rather than representation per se. The IWW engaged in a campaign in a sector where 
collective bargaining via the statutory route was a technical impossibility, barring 
changes in employment law or the classification of food delivery platform workers. It, 
therefore, prioritised informal bargaining via direct action rather than formal negotia-
tions. Likewise, BFAWU had success in organising Wetherspoon workers when they 
abandoned a ‘50% + 1’ membership density target in favour of building towards collec-
tive action. While both workers and unions in both case studies would likely be open to 
formal collective bargaining agreements (and, in fact, this was one demand of the 
Wetherspoon strike), they were not fixated on formal recognition and willing to engage 
in some strategic flexibility. As Hodder et al. (2017) demonstrated, strikes can lead to 
significant membership growth in the striking workplace. The shortest path to union 
growth in greenfield workplaces and a successful process of distant expansion is via 
strike action.
Both organising drives also emerged in response to worker self-organisation. Strikes 
among food delivery platform workers and organising efforts amongst Wetherspoons 
workers both predated union organising processes. IWW conventional wisdom sug-
gests that engaging with workers’ ‘hot shops’ (workplaces where collective action is 
already in the pipeline ahead of union involvement) is likely to consume large amounts 
of organisational resource without providing a commensurate return. However, in 
these cases, following up on ‘hot shops’ provided both unions with substantial oppor-
tunities. These cases indicate that organising strategies might do well to finesse union 
follow-up processes in response to initial contact by groups of self-organised workers, 
who often constitute a key part of the ‘militant minority’ (Darlington 2009; Uetricht 
& Eidlin 2019). Where action was controlled by the workers themselves, it tended to 
be at its most successful, in terms of exerting both workplace and associational lever-
age. These case studies indicate that organisation with the aim of action should not 
only emphasise grassroots leadership of the organising process but also in the resulting 
mobilisation processes. The bottom-up exertion of power seems to be both objectively 
and subjectively central to the function of being a stage in an escalating organising 
process. In institutional terms, both case studies were significant successes. Both 
unions extended their presences beyond their traditional bases, gaining both experi-
ence and members in the process. Retrospective evaluations of organising processes on 
the basis of political criteria have often been lacking from the literature (Simms & 
Holgate 2010).
We believe that these two case studies have contributed to the task of developing the 
working-class movement in Britain such that if the workers’ movement in Britain is to 
be revived, it will be through politically informed organising methodologies which ini-
tially aim for action rather than representation, build from existing worker self-organisa-
tion and empower grassroots workers to determine the course of the struggles in their 
workplaces. However, there remains an important question to be asked about how these 
struggles from the alternative unions could generalise to the rest of the workers move-
ment. As many of these unions – including IWGB and United Voices of the World 
(UVW) – are splits from mainstream unions, the connections between them can be 
limited. These examples remain at a relatively small scale for now, but they do provide 
powerful examples of how struggles can be organised today.
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